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IN WATER WHEEL, THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
CORRECTS A LIMITATION ON TRIBAL 
COURT JURISDICTION 
Blair M. Rinne* 
Abstract: On June 10, 2011, in Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. 
LaRance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a tribal 
court had jurisdiction over a non-Indian corporation and its non-Indian 
president through the tribe’s inherent authority to exclude and manage its 
land. The Ninth Circuit limited the application of Montana v. United States, 
a case restricting tribal authority, to situations involving non-tribal land or 
to situations in which competing state interests are at play. In so doing, the 
court gave tribal courts the breadth of power Congress intended. 
Introduction 
 The Colorado River Indian Tribe (CRIT) is a federally-recognized 
tribe with a reservation that was established by Congress in 1865.1 
CRIT’s judicial system is comprised of a tribal court and a tribal court 
of appeals.2 Its tribal court system is established by tribal ordinance with 
jurisdiction over “any person who . . . uses or possesses any property 
within the Reservation for any civil cause of action arising from such . . . 
use or possession.”3 CRIT also enacted a Property Code, allowing a 
cause of action to evict any person who occupies the premises after rea-
sonable demand to leave.4 Congress has granted Indian tribes the au-
thority to establish such ordinances and judicial systems.5 
 Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. (“Water Wheel”) is a 
non-Indian corporation that was leasing tribal land from CRIT.6 Robert 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2011–2012). 
1 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Tribal Defendants-
Appellants at 1, Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 
2011) (Nos. 09-17349 & 09-17357). 
2 Id. at 8. 
3 Id. (quoting CRIT Law & Order Code § 101.c (1974), available at http://www.crit-
nsn.gov/crit_contents/ordinances/Law_and_Order_Code.pdf). 
4 See id. 
5 Id. at 2 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 3601(4)–(5) (2006)). 
6 Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 804–05 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
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Johnson was Water Wheel’s non-Indian president who was living on 
CRIT’s tribal land.7 A lease dispute arose between the parties, and 
eventually CRIT brought an action against Water Wheel and Johnson 
in the tribal court for eviction, unpaid rent, damages, and attorney’s 
fees.8 The tribal court ruled in favor of CRIT.9 
                                                                                                                     
 Water Wheel and Johnson filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the tribal court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over both parties, and that the court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over Johnson.10 The district court found 
that the tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction over Water Wheel 
based on an exception to Montana v. United States, a Supreme Court de-
cision limiting tribal jurisdiction.11 The district court found that tribal 
court did not, however, have any jurisdiction over Johnson.12 The Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, hold-
ing that the tribe had subject matter jurisdiction over both Water 
Wheel and Johnson.13  
 The Ninth Circuit limited the application of Montana to situations 
involving the exercise of tribal authority over nonmembers on non-
tribal land unless there are competing state interests at play.14 Although 
the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Montana excep-
tions might be satisfied in this case, the court determined that such an 
analysis was unnecessary because the district court had improperly ap-
plied a Montana exception to activity on tribal land.15 In situations in-
volving tribal land, when the actions of a non-Indian have interfered 
with the ability of the tribe to exclude and manage that land, the tribe’s 
status as a landowner is sufficient for a tribal court to have jurisdic-
 
7 Id. at 805. 
8 Id. at 805–06. 
9 Id. at 806. 
10 Id. at 805–07. 
11 Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 807; see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564–66 
(1981). 
12 Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 807–08. 
13 Id. at 805, 820. 
14 See id. at 813–14. 
15 Id. at 814, 816; see Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–66. The Ninth Circuit noted that “the 
[district] court failed to recognize that in applying Montana unnecessarily, it improperly 
expanded limitations on tribal sovereignty that, with only one narrow exception, have 
been applied exclusively to non-Indian land.” Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 807 n.4. 
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tion.16 In so deciding, the Ninth Circuit gives tribal courts the breadth 
of power Congress intended.17 
I. The Montana Exceptions, Water Wheel’s Lease, and the 
Ensuing Lawsuits 
 Montana v. United States “is the pathmarking case concerning tribal 
civil authority over nonmembers.”18 In Montana, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the Crow Indian Tribe could not regulate hunt-
ing and fishing by nonmembers of the tribe on land owned by non-
members, despite the nonmembers’ land being within the reserva-
tion.19 The Court established a limitation on tribal civil authority over 
nonmembers, holding that tribal authority cannot be exercised “be-
yond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations . . . .”20 The Court allowed two exceptions to this 
rule.21 Tribal authority may be exercised over nonmembers beyond 
what is necessary to protect self-government or to control internal rela-
tions (1) when a consensual relationship exists between nonmembers 
and the tribe or its members; or (2) when the conduct of a nonmem-
ber “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”22 
A. Water Wheel’s Lease 
 In 1975, CRIT and Water Wheel signed a business lease for twenty-
six acres of tribe-owned land on CRIT’s reservation.23 On the land, Wa-
ter Wheel operated a recreational resort with facilities including a ma-
rina, convenience store, bar, and trailer and camping spaces.24 Pursu-
ant to the lease, Water Wheel paid CRIT a percentage of the gross re-
                                                                                                                      
16 See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814, 816. 
17 See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16–17 (1987) (emphasizing Congres-
sional policy promoting tribal self-government); Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow 
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985) (“Congress is committed to a policy of support-
ing tribal self-government and self-determination.”); Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814, 816. 
18 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997). 
19 450 U.S. 544, 566–67 (1980). 
20 Id. at 564. 
21 See id. at 565–66; Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 
802, 809 (9th Cir. 2011). 
22 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66; Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 809. 
23 Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 805. 
24 Id. 
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ceipts from the resort and rent of one hundred dollars per acre.25 After 
twenty-five years, the parties were to renegotiate the rent based on the 
property’s market value.26 
                                                                                                                     
 In 1981, Robert Johnson, a non-Indian, purchased half of Water 
Wheel’s stock.27 Four years later, he purchased the remaining stock, 
became the president of Water Wheel, and began living at the site.28 
For over twenty-two years, Johnson lived at the site, controlling and op-
erating the resort.29 When the parties attempted to renegotiate the 
lease in 2000, they failed to reach an agreement.30 The following year, 
Water Wheel stopped paying CRIT the percentage of gross business 
receipts.31 Water Wheel paid only nominal rent in 2003 and 2004, and 
beginning in 2005 Water Wheel stopped paying rent altogether.32 After 
the lease expired on July 6, 2007, Water Wheel and Johnson continued 
to operate the resort and refused to vacate the property while paying 
nothing to the tribe.33  
B. The Lawsuits 
 CRIT brought an action against Water Wheel and Johnson in tribal 
court for eviction, unpaid rent, and damages from the tribe’s loss of use 
of their property.34 Water Wheel and Johnson moved to dismiss, arguing 
that the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over both parties, 
and that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Johnson in part be-
cause his relationship with CRIT was involuntary.35 The tribal court de-
nied the motion to dismiss and ruled in favor of CRIT on all claims.36 
 
25 Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, No. CV-08-0474-PHX-DGC, 
2009 WL 3089216, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 
642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011). 
26 Id. 





32 Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 805. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 805–07; Water Wheel, 2009 WL 3089216, at *4. In addition, Water Wheel and 
Johnson attempted to overcome the lease by arguing that the land did not belong to CRIT 
or that the lease was with the United States, and not CRIT. Water Wheel, 2009 WL 3089216, 
at *4. The district court decided that these arguments were “foreclosed by “[p]laintiffs’ 
repeated concession that this case [did] not challenge the Indian title or reservation status 
of the land,” and by the parties’ dealings with each other as landlord and tenant for over 
twenty years. Id. at *2, *4. 
36 Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 806. 
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The court held that Johnson and Water Wheel were “alter egos,” and 
the court pierced the corporate veil to hold Johnson personally and 
jointly liable for the damages resulting from the breach.37 Johnson and 
Water Wheel appealed, and the tribal court of appeals affirmed.38 
 Water Wheel and Johnson then filed a complaint against the tribal 
court judge and the court’s clerk in the District Court for the District of 
Arizona, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the tribal 
court’s jurisdiction.39 The district court held that the tribal court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over Water Wheel through Montana’s first 
exception—a consensual relationship between non-Indians and the 
tribe or its members—because the corporation had entered into a con-
sensual relationship with the tribe.40 Nevertheless, the court held that 
the tribal court did not have jurisdiction over Johnson because he had 
not voluntarily consented to the tribal court’s jurisdiction.41 
 Both parties appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s decision as to Johnson and, on different reasoning, affirmed as 
to Water Wheel.42 The Ninth Circuit found that the tribe had regula-
tory and adjudicative jurisdiction over Water Wheel, but not based on 
Montana.43 Instead, because there were no competing state interests at 
play, the court concluded that CRIT’s right to exercise jurisdiction 
flowed from the tribe’s inherent authority to exclude and manage its 
own land.44 
 The Ninth Circuit added that even if Montana applied, the tribe 
would still have jurisdiction over both Water Wheel and Johnson be-
cause both of the Montana exceptions would be satisfied.45 The Ninth 
Circuit expressly refuted the district court’s finding that Johnson had 
not consented to a relationship with the tribe.46 The tribe had jurisdic-
tion over Johnson because he should have anticipated tribal jurisdic-
tion based on his business dealings with CRIT which took place on the 
tribe’s land.47 Moreover, the tribal court had personal jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                      
 
37 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 807. 
40 Id.; see Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66. 
41 Water Wheel, 2009 WL 3089216, at *8–10. 
42 See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 808, 816, 820. 
43 Id. at 814, 816. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 816–17. 
46 Id. at 818. 
47 See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 818. Johnson was also not protected by the fiduciary 
shield rule because it was an established fact that Johnson was Water Wheel’s “alter ego,” 
and therefore Johnson’s actions on behalf of Water Wheel were also on behalf of himself. 
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Johnson based on traditional personal jurisdiction principles because 
he was both physically present on the tribal land and had sufficient 
minimum contacts with the land.48 Therefore, even though the tribal 
court had jurisdiction over Johnson based on its inherent authority, it 
would have also had jurisdiction based on traditional principles of per-
sonal jurisdiction and either Montana exception.49 
II. The Courts’ Conflicting Bases for Establishing Tribal 
Jurisdiction 
 The key difference between the district court’s and the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s bases for jurisdiction was the applicability of Montana v. United 
States.50 The district court determined that the tribal court had jurisdic-
tion based on the first Montana exception because there was a consen-
sual relationship between Water Wheel and CRIT.51 The court found 
that the lease between Water Wheel and CRIT was a classic example of a 
consensual relationship under Montana because commercial dealings, 
contracts, leases, or other arrangements are acceptable bases for the 
exception.52 As the lawsuit resulted from Water Wheel’s lease, the rela-
tionship met the Supreme Court’s requirement that the regulation im-
posed by the tribe have a nexus to the consensual relationship.53 Ac-
cording to the district court, the tribe’s status as the landowner did not 
obviate the need to apply Montana.54 It determined that a tribe’s juris-
diction over nonmembers must be exercised within the Montana frame-
work, implying that the tribe’s inherent power to exclude does not in-
dependently provide a basis for jurisdiction.55 
 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that the tribal court had juris-
diction irrespective of Montana because there were no competing state 
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 818–19 (citing Katzir’s Floor & Home Design, Inc. v. M-MLS.com, 394 F.3d 1143, 
1149 (9th Cir. 2004); Davis v. Metro Prods., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
48 Id. at 819–20 (citing Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990); Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
49 See id. at 816–17, 819–20. 
50 See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 814, 816 
(9th Cir. 2011); Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, No. CV-08-0474-
PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3089216, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011). 
51 Water Wheel, 2009 WL 3089216, at *5; see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 
(1981). 
52 Water Wheel, 2009 WL 3089216, at *3. 
53 Id. at *3; see Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001) (describing 
the nexus requirement for Montana’s consensual relationship exception). 
54 Water Wheel, 2009 WL 3089216, at *4 n.5. 
55 See id. at *10–12. 
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interests at play, the activity being regulated took place on CRIT’s land, 
and the activity interfered directly with CRIT’s inherent power to ex-
clude and manage its lands.56 According to the Ninth Circuit, the tribe 
had jurisdiction based on “the long-standing rule that Indian tribes 
possess inherent sovereign powers, including the authority to exclude 
. . . unless Congress clearly and unambiguously says otherwise.”57 The 
tribe’s power to exclude nonmembers from its land necessarily includes 
the incidental power to regulate because the tribe should be able to set 
conditions on nonmembers’ entry.58 The court determined that Mon-
tana did not affect this finding.59 
 Although the Ninth Circuit and the district court disagreed about 
the basis of the tribal court’s jurisdiction, both courts supported their 
approaches with precedent.60 The Ninth Circuit cited a number of Su-
preme Court cases supporting its finding of tribal court jurisdiction 
without applying Montana.61 In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe and New 
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, the Supreme Court addressed whether 
tribes have inherent authority irrespective of Montana.62 In Merrion, the 
Court recognized a tribe’s inherent authority to exclude nonmembers 
from tribal land without discussing Montana.63 There, the Supreme 
Court upheld a tribal tax as a condition of entry for non-Indians con-
ducting business on tribal land.64 In Mescalero Apache Tribe, the Court 
remanded a case for reconsideration in light of Montana regarding 
hunting and fishing regulation rights on tribe-owned land.65 On re-
                                                                                                                      
56 Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814, 816. 
57 Id. at 808; see Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (stating that tribal 
courts can presume civil jurisdiction over non-Indian activities on the reservation unless 
Congress has said otherwise). 
58 Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 811–12 (citing South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 
(1993); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982)). 
59 Id. at 812. The tribal court also had adjudicative jurisdiction because of “the impor-
tant sovereign interests at stake, [and] the existence of regulatory jurisdiction . . . .” Id. at 
816. A tribal court must have subject matter jurisdiction consisting of both regulatory and 
adjudicative jurisdiction. Id. at 809. The court addressed the firmly-established rule “that 
adjudicative jurisdiction is confined by the bounds of a tribe’s regulatory jurisdiction,” 
which is satisfied in this case. Id. at 814. 
60 See id. at 812 (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 330–31 
(1983)); Water Wheel, 2009 WL 3089216, at *4 n.5 (citing Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 
359–60 (2001)). 
61 See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 812 (citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144–45; Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, 462 U.S. at 330–31). 
62 See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 330–31; Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144–45. 
63 See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 133, 144; Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 812. 
64 See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144–45. 
65 462 U.S. at 324, 330. 
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mand, the Ninth Circuit adhered to its earlier determination, and the 
Supreme Court later affirmed, that Montana did not affect the question 
at issue because “Montana concerned lands located within the reserva-
tion but not owned by the [t]ribe or its members.”66 
 The Supreme Court has almost exclusively applied Montana to sit-
uations involving non-Indian land or its equivalent, such as land within 
the reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians.67 For example, in 
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., the Court applied 
Montana to preclude a tribe from regulating the sale of non-Indian 
land, even though the land was within the tribe’s reservation.68 In Strate 
v. A-1 Contractors, the Court applied Montana to preclude tribal jurisdic-
tion over a civil action involving a car accident on a public highway, 
even though the highway passed over the tribe’s reservation.69 The 
Court in Strate specified that Montana applied to situations “on non-
Indian land,” and expressly stated that its decision did not address in-
stances “when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a reserva-
tion.”70 The Court reiterated this distinction in Atkinson Trading Co. v. 
Shirley, describing the Montana exceptions as “two possible bases for 
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian fee land.”71 
 Despite the Supreme Court’s trend of applying Montana only to 
situations on non-Indian land, the district court relied on a Supreme 
Court decision that does not follow the trend—Nevada v. Hicks.72 In 
Hicks, the Court applied Montana to a situation involving Indian-owned 
land.73 There, the Court precluded tribal jurisdiction over state officials 
who entered tribal land to execute a search warrant against a tribe 
member.74 The tribe member was suspected of violating state law off 
the reservation, and the Court determined that “[t]he State’s interest 
in execution of process [was] considerable . . . .”75 Furthermore, “tribal 
authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the 
                                                                                                                      
66 See id. at 330–31. 
67 Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 809. 
68 554 U.S. 316, 330, 332 (2008). In Bourland, the Court explained that a tribe that 
conveyed land to non-Indians “lost the right of absolute use and occupation . . . [and that] 
the [t]ribe no longer had the incidental power to regulate the use of the lands . . . .” 508 
U.S. at 688. 
69 520 U.S. 438, 442, 456 (1997). 
70 See id. at 442, 446 (emphasis added). 
71 532 U.S. 645, 651 (2001) (emphasis added). 
72 See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001); Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 809–10; Water 
Wheel, 2009 WL 3089216, at *4 n.5. 
73 533 U.S. at 358, 370. 
74 Id. at 355, 364, 366. 
75 Id. at 355, 364. 
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violation, off reservation, of state laws [was] not essential to tribal self-
government . . . .”76 In other words, the state had a competing interest, 
so the tribe’s power of exclusion was not enough to assert regulatory 
jurisdiction.77 Jurisdiction could only be established through one of the 
Montana exceptions, and neither exception was met.78 According to 
Hicks, Montana “clearly impl[ies] that the general rule of Montana ap-
plies to both Indian and non-Indian land,” and ownership of the land is 
only one factor to be considered.79  
 In addition to Hicks, the district court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe to support its application 
of Montana to Indian-owned land.80 In Hardin, the Ninth Circuit al-
lowed a tribal court to permanently exclude from the reservation a 
nonmember who was living on tribal land.81 Although the court did 
not explicitly apply the Montana exceptions, the court referenced the 
consensual relationship exception in finding that the nonmember’s 
lease with the Tribe conferred jurisdiction on the tribal court.82 There-
fore, both the Ninth Circuit and the district court agreed that the tribal 
court had some jurisdiction over Water Wheel, but they disagreed 
about the basis for that jurisdiction and the extent of its reach.83 
III. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach Aligns with Federal Policy 
and Supreme Court Precedent 
 The distinction between the courts’ holdings is significant because 
finding jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal land only by applying 
Montana improperly limits the reach of tribal jurisdiction and ignores 
tribes’ inherent authority.84 The Commerce Clause allows Congress to 
regulate commerce with Indian Tribes, a power the Supreme Court 
describes as “plenary and exclusive,” and federal policies of deference 
                                                                                                                      
76 Id. 
77 Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 813. 
78 See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359 n.3, 371. 
79 Id. at 360. 
80 See Water Wheel, 2009 WL 3089216, at *11–12 (citing Hardin v. White Mountain 
Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
81 779 F.2d at 478–79. 
82 See id. at 479. The district court also relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Plains 
Commerce Bank in which the Court described Montana’s general rule as restricting tribal 
authority over nonmember activities taking place on the reservation. See Water Wheel, 2009 
WL 3089216, at *11–12 (citing Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 328). 
83 See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814, 816; Water Wheel, 2009 WL 3089216, at *5. 
84 See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 813–14 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
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to tribal courts promoting tribal self-government are well established.85 
For example, the Indian Tribal Justice Act, which facilitates federal as-
sistance to tribal court systems, demonstrates Congress’s intent to sup-
port and encourage the growth of tribal self-government.86 In its find-
ings, Congress emphasized that “Indian tribes possess the inherent au-
thority to establish their own form of government, including tribal 
justice systems . . . .”87 
 The Supreme Court has acknowledged Congress’s interest in 
promoting tribal self-government and a federal policy of deference to 
tribal courts.88 In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of 
Indians, the Court established the exhaustion doctrine, requiring that 
parties exhaust tribal court remedies before a federal court may enter-
tain a civil action.89 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Court further 
noted that “a proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for 
the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread 
lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.”90 In Iowa 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, the Court emphasized that “[t]ribal 
courts play a vital role in tribal self-government,” and that “the Federal 
Government has consistently encouraged their development.”91 
 Notwithstanding the precedent cited by the district court, both the 
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have demonstrated that Montana 
should not be applied to situations on tribe-owned land where there 
are no competing state interests at play.92 Although the district court 
relied on Nevada v. Hicks, the Hicks Court limited its holding to “the 
question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state 
                                                                                                                      
85 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Ya-
kima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470 (1979); see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 
(2004); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16–17 (1987); Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 
808. 
86 Laurie Reynolds, “Jurisdiction” in Federal Indian Law: Confusion, Contradiction, and Su-
preme Court Precedent, 27 N.M. L. Rev. 359, 359 (1997); see Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 
U.S.C. § 3611 (2006); see also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 14–15 n.6 (citing Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006) (providing for establishment of educational 
classes for training tribal court judges)). 
87 25 U.S.C. § 3601(4). 
88 See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985). 
89 Id. at 856–57; Deborah F. Buckman, Construction and Application of Federal Tribal Ex-
haustion Doctrine, 186 A.L.R. Fed. 71, 90 (2003). 
90 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978). 
91 See 480 U.S. at 14–15. 
92 See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 330–31 (1983); Elliott v. 
White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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law.”93 Both prior to and in the Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. 
v. LaRance decision, the Ninth Circuit established that Hicks has limited 
applicability and should not be extended to conduct of non-Indians on 
tribal land unless there exists a competing state interest, such as the 
regulating of state officers related to off-reservation violations in 
Hicks.94 
 The effect of the Ninth Circuit’s decision is already evident.95 In a 
recent decision by the District Court for the District of Arizona, a non-
Indian plaintiff brought an action against members of a tribal council 
regarding a revenue-sharing project with an Indian-owned corporation 
that was located on tribal land.96 The plaintiff argued that the tribal 
court did not have jurisdiction since neither Montana exception ap-
plied.97 The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit because the 
situation involved tribal land and there were no competing state inter-
ests at play, making it likely that the tribal court had jurisdiction.98 Had 
the court accepted the plaintiff’s argument and based jurisdiction on 
Montana instead of the tribe’s inherent authority to exclude nonmem-
bers, the tribal court may have been unable to adjudicate this dispute 
involving and occurring on its land.99 Water Wheel protects against such 
scenarios and thereby advances Congress’s intent to support and en-
courage tribal self-government.100 
                                                                                                                      
93 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 n.2 (2001); see Water Wheel Camp Recreational 
Area, Inc. v. LaRance, No. CV-08-0474-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3089216, at *4 n.5 (D. Ariz. 
Sept. 23, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011). 
94 Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 813; see Hicks, 533 U.S. at 355, 364; Elliott, 566 F.3d at 850 
(“We reject Plaintiff’s argument that the Court’s holding in Hicks forecloses tribal court 
jurisdiction [over non-Indians on tribal land].”); McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530, 540 n.9 
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Conclusion 
 The Ninth Circuit corrected the district court’s limitation on tribal 
jurisdiction by reversing its erroneous application of Montana v. United 
States. The Ninth Circuit’s holding still allows a federal court to preclude 
tribal court jurisdiction over a non-Indian when the activity occurs on 
non-tribal land or a competing state interest exists. In Water Wheel Camp 
Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the 
tribal court had jurisdiction because the land belonged to the tribe and 
there were no competing state interests at play. The court’s conclusion 
that a Montana analysis is unnecessary when determining jurisdiction 
over activities on Indian land properly aligns with both Supreme Court 
precedent and important federal policy. As the Ninth Circuit stated, de-
ciding otherwise “would impermissibly interfere with the tribe’s inher-
ent sovereignty, contradict long-standing principles the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly recognized, and conflict with Congress’s interest in pro-
moting tribal self-government.”101 
 
101 Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 816 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
